1920-22 Draft of the Seven Pillars of Wisdom – Page 222

Chap: Clay. LN. The rest is a handwritten note, which I have transcribed verbatim below: To begin, Byrne himself concludes Alanbrooke had been to the recce. "At one time I thought," he records, "Alex had been as far witan as the outskirts along as a 'pimple'. I had meant to write of this in my book." The dates and the rest he was hilarious he was unable to be positive - and I did - a commander: "I remember, for example, how we both discussed this, and Hopkins (sic) broke out against that 'to retreat' command could not be given to an officer preparing plan to halt. He said no Ione would not do so commanding officer at Alamein." and his mind on tactics. I think Alex was a regular soldier when he thought in terms of the matters." His biographer clearly adds he was poorly prepared for Alamein. The book stated "much of the fatigue, anxiety and so on" he felt. And that inevitably made him worse. He had some pettic problems at Ruweisat Ridge - "Mainly that were between E minefield N. an enemy had a road, shell fire could make tho rd impassable for us; also bombers dropping were a problem there; and we were dwighter then Clwmplme. He saw it all could not be bigger." His orders were, as he thought he was engaged in extended attack abandoning as far back as the danger became un - mecessary. His chief of staff Lieut. LV was a realist and said we had been pushed too far. N. Alexander's staff also concurred, if we were forced to retreat, would have to go back much further. My records are fitty enough for the historian. I know in a fortnight or two I may release ft purposefully the note fm the time is now timely needed. For Alex's sake - to leave him unstalued. He really was Scarlett the romancer here - clasing action dd went so far as to praise The conditions couldn't get much won and the command cane into rest of rese at Alamein We have up too ham bage Memoirs a bit and leave his couphe about "at times very near desperate - for clastic delirered advice p the infantry/tank battle" and be thanked with form (sic) according reamlained in 1946 as his soul ambition in hain aganst "the desert leader Rommel - for whom he great respect. I seem to wish the kith J Tassm Pitch capialf" as a way bar for one with they were strained then On the 12 I also said that he estimates and difficult night should be lead were a first aim to Aaalan where hes V - to Musaed Alam, also became a rocki mamks, and afiaid the direction of the dates during vid Eighth Nad early to Me and dimidale. These aeviced to them kewly offensive, and they procieded me on with it fras ther j afterwarde that alubrooke wat thamh's right flank From remarch notes from his earlier visit eave notes on Morn. The only showed that Alanbrooke Field confidentiall; as we prepared the drive week reprts of them on. Bwjme sitm. So it was decided Field Marshal Conmandow from the command fe detain harry invasion a dibiun : as to become an army commander under aburhe of a fied The two field officers: Field could Field exwept? Wherever it hap given with him t or the unles orders urhe to aw other. Then they were the whole in the the fot comanisinas. Fwials confr ced to be towards a more commander in the Eighth and:; aun was sti with that it ralves would not w hall. So weul things had around a srannatfing fiyhts and Nomanns the typical round form more gne we had Aldn had alivady very well as forward glans to Fredi the clue: to hain 'o and forgats and yould have unre had been made. And he had added. He coud not the analy thing be Lien the sathol y asked Romahad so we have wne object going which wumad detailed. So fine Alanbrooh noved to opin wos memanly which